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Abstract
This article explores the interrelationship between global production networks
(GPNs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) in the South Korean auto industry
and its employment relations. It focuses on the production network of the
Hyundai Motor Group (HMG) — the third biggest automobile manufacturer
in the world — and the FTA between the EU and South Korea. This was the
ﬁrst of the EU’s ‘new generation’ FTAs, which among other things contained
provisions designed to protect and promote labour standards. The article’s
argument is twofold. First, thatHMG’s production network andKorea’s political
economy (of which HMG is a crucial part) limited the possibilities for the
FTA’s labour provisions to take effect. Second, that the commercial provisions
in this same FTA simultaneously eroded HMG’s domestic market and corporate
proﬁtability, leading to adverse consequences for auto workers in the more
insecure and low-paid jobs. Inmaking this argument, the article advances amulti-
scalar conceptualization of the labour regime as an analytical intermediary
between GPNs and FTAs. It also provides one of the ﬁrst empirical studies of
the EU–South Korea FTA in terms of employment relations, drawing on 105
interviews with trade unions, employer associations, automobile companies and
state officials across both parties.
1. Introduction
Amajor driver and outcome of trade-based integration in the global economy
has been the enhanced capacity of capital to organize highly calibrated
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networks of production across various jurisdictions. Trade-based integration
refers to the liberalization of import tariffs and quotas, the standardization
of products and practices across national regulatory systems and the
constitutionalization of political processes governing economic activity. This
has functioned to integrate economic space on the basis of broadly consistent
rules, contributing to the creation, stabilization or intensiﬁcation of capital
accumulation (Azmeh 2015; Bair 2006; Campling 2016; Curran et al. 2019;
Smith 2015a). Researchers deploying global production network (GPN) and
global value chain frameworks have drawn attention to the ways in which
this cross-border accumulation has been coordinated by transnational capital,
in particular those organizations dubbed ‘lead ﬁrms’. This coordination has
been premised on putting suppliers in sharper competition with one another
such that cost-cutting cascades through the network or chain of ﬁrms, directly
and indirectly squeezing workers and the social reproduction of labouring
classes (Mezzadri 2016; Pattenden 2016; Pickles and Smith 2016; Selwyn
2015).
Societal responses to this phenomenon, led by social movements and
trade unions, have included a series of campaigns against consumer-facing
lead ﬁrms, with brand-name companies in apparel, food and electronics
among the most prominent targets. This has led to new forms of non-
state labour governance, such as internal codes of conduct and external
certiﬁcation schemes against which supply chain practices have been audited
(see Locke 2013; Jackson et al. 2018). Among the state-regulatory responses
has been a revival of policy interest in the ‘trade–labour linkage’. Following
the failed attempt to include a social clause in the formation of the
World Trade Organization in the 1990s, a linkage to labour standards has
reappeared in a large number of free trade agreements (FTAs). One-third
of all trade agreements now contain labour provisions, with the largest
proportion accounted for by the EU (ILO 2016: 22). Compared to the
extensive literature assessing non-state or ‘private’ governance, research on
the internationalization of state-based labour governance remains relatively
thin.
The 2011 EU–South Korea FTA (EUKOR) was the EU’s ﬁrst ‘new
generation’ trade agreement; so-called because it contained a range of
provisions that went far beyond what had been agreed — and what could
plausibly be included — at the multilateral level (see European Commission
2019b). Among these were provisions on labour and environmental standards,
brought together in a Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapter of
the agreement. TSD chapters have since become a standard ﬁxture in EU trade
policy, featuring in FTAs signed with 17 other states as of 2018, including
those with major national economies such as Canada and Japan. Research
that has sought to do more than identify changes in labour law — a common
approach in analysing trade–labour linkages — is now emerging. This has
traced the impacts of TSD chapters on labour governance and employment
relations in EU trade partners, yet focused on the labour provisions somewhat
in isolation from the rest of the agreement (Marx et al. 2016; Orbie et al. 2017;
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Harrison et al. 2019). By bracketing out the wider ramiﬁcations of FTAs for
workers, this approach risks siloing the study of trade-related labour issues to
a discreet set of provisions.
As noted above, GPN research takes an inter-ﬁrm approach to the study of
employment relations, highlighting the differentiated consequences for wages,
working conditions and collective action in lead ﬁrms and suppliers at various
tiers (see Jenkins and Blyton 2017; Lakhani et al. 2013; Newsome et al. 2015;
Reinecke et al. 2018). In this regard, it has done much to illuminate the effects
of the globalization of production onworking lives and the changing nature of
labour governance, both at the ﬁrm-level and within the domestic institutional
arrangements in which GPNs are embedded. Yet it has largely downplayed
the inﬂuence of international trade agreements on work, despite the fact that
these inter-state agreements have provided the very opportunity for GPNs
to proliferate (for exceptions, see Anner et al. 2013; Tran et al. 2017; Smith
et al. 2018). This is especially problematic given the increasing incorporation
of labour provisions in FTAs, which have received scant attention to
date.
This article seeks to bring together these parallel literatures to take into
account the interrelationship between FTAs and GPNs. Its central argument
is twofold. First, thatHyundaiMotorGroup’s (HMG) production network—
and the Korean political economy of which it is a central part — limited the
possibilities for the FTA’s labour provisions to take effect. Second, that the
commercial provisions of this same FTA shifted the competitive conditions
in the Korean auto market and contributed to eroding HMG proﬁts, with
adverse impacts on workers in the more insecure and low-paid jobs, especially
those located in the lower tiers of the production network. In making this
argument, the article advances a multi-scalar conceptualization of the ‘labour
regime’ as an analytical intermediary betweenGPNs and FTAs, allowing their
interrelated impacts on employment relations to be better understood (see also
Pattenden 2016; Smith et al. 2018). Alongside this analytical contribution,
the article also provides one of the ﬁrst empirical studies of the effects of
EUKOR on employment relations; an agreement which remains politically
signiﬁcant as the precedent and public exemplar of the EU’s TSD chapters and
supposed commitment ‘to ensuring that trade policy is also about promoting
values such as the protection of human rights [and] labour rights’ (European
Commission 2019a: 8). Our case study on the automotive industry is especially
salient as it was an area of major concern to both sides in the negotiation and
implementation of EUKOR. This was because of the commercial signiﬁcance
of the trade in automobiles and auto parts, as well as the high-proﬁle struggles
between themilitant labourmovement and politically powerful conglomerates
(chaebols) in Korea that would serve as a formidable test for the EU’s stated
trade policy intentions.
The rest of the article proceeds in the following sections. Section 2 sets
out our approach to understand the articulations of trade-based integration,
GPNs and their employment relations consequences through the analytical
prism of the labour regime. Section 3 provides an overview of the automotive
C© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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production network and labour regime in South Korea with particular
emphasis on network governance, the distribution of value among ﬁrms and
workers and employment relations dynamics. This sets the context within
which the trade agreement’s labour provisions would be operationalized.
Section 4 shows how the EUKOR provisions around automotive trade and
labour standards were negotiated and what their implications have been for
the Korean automotive labour regime. Section 5 concludes.
2. Labour regimes, GPNs and trade-based integration
Labour regimes can be deﬁned as ‘the interrelation of (segmented) labour
markets and recruitment, condition of employment and labour processes
and forms of enterprise authority and control, when they coalesce in
sociologically well-deﬁned clusters with their own discernible “logic” and
“effects”’ (Bernstein 2007: 7). Heeding Thompson and Smith’s (2009) call for
labour process theory to move beyond distinct workplaces, the approach we
adopt here is one that recognizes the variegated scales at which a labour regime
is constituted. Distinct formations have been explored at the local scale (e.g.
Burawoy 1985; Jonas 1996; Smith and Pun 2006), the national (e.g. Anner
2015), the macro-regional (Smith et al. 2018) and in the relationship between
them (Baglioni 2018; Taylor andRioux 2018). As Pattenden (2016) argues, the
labour regime is a useful mediating category between the day-to-day labour
processes of a particular workplace with its diverse ‘forms of exploitation’ and
the more abstract ‘general forms of domination’ under capitalism. It is this
multi-scalar quality that is particularly helpful for bringing GPNs and FTAs
together, since the former governs labour at the level of the ﬁrm according
to a transnational spatial formation, and the latter at the level of the state
according to an international spatial formation.
Our starting point is thus to conceptualize a labour regime as composed of
nested scales, institutionalized formally in organizations with codiﬁed rules
but also informally in relational norms and habits (Smith et al. 2018; see
also Baglioni 2018). The ﬁrst scale is the workplace, which includes the
labour process and its ‘dynamics of control, consent, and resistance’ and at
which point the organization of labour in the production process provides
the basis for the creation and appropriation of surplus value (Thompson
and Smith 2009; see also Cumbers et al. 2008). This is the scale at which
popular campaigns tend to politicize working conditions and scrutinize the
effectiveness of trade-related labour provisions, as seen in the response to
the Rana Plaza collapse that implicated a number of EU-based clothing
companies in the deaths of garment factory workers in Bangladesh. The
second scale is the national, comprising the state regulation of labour
standards and the industrial relations of nationally-organized labour and
capital. This is, in theory, where trade-based integration ought to have most
effect on employment relations, especially where states are required to adopt
or follow certain rules around labour standards as a matter of law. The third
C© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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TABLE 1
Distribution of Interviewees by Category
Industry
representatives
Trade union
officials/
worker
representatives
State officials/
political
representatives Expertsa
Total
participants in
Domestic
Advisory Group
or Trade and
Sustainable
Development
Committee
South Korea
(Jincheon, Sejong
City, Seoul, Ulsan)
19 28 4 16 13
Brussels 8 8 16 6 10
aIncludes academics, consultants and, in Korea, researchers at several quasi-government research
institutes.
scale is the GPNs through which the conﬁguration of power relations —
network governance — among suppliers and lead ﬁrms is deployed. This
allows for the recognition of distinct forms of exploitation, including those
shaped by varieties of subcontracting relationships. This practice can subvert
labour law and reduce or even avoid formal worker negotiation (Kelly 2001;
Mezzadri 2016), as happened in Korea as we show below in the distinction
between ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ workers; the latter category referring to those
on shorter contracts with fewer beneﬁts and greater insecurity. Trade-based
integration can also play a role at this scale in reconﬁguring relationships
among ﬁrms and the coordination of GPNs. For example, trade agreements
can be used to spread the adoption of a particular country’s product safety
standards, which gives its home ﬁrms commercial beneﬁts in terms of scale
economies and the ability to procure from a wider range of suppliers;
something again that occurred in the case we consider (Campling 2008; Smith
2015b).
The ways in which these three scales interact to shape employment relations
is an empirical question. For example, relations at the workplace scale cannot
be read off from those at the national scale (and vice versa) because of
the relative autonomy that actors have at different scales. . It is for this
reason that our methodology relied on an extensive range of interviews with
representatives located in a relevant position of authority within our nested
scales. These were asked to point to the particular pressures affecting labour
governance and employment relations in their area of responsibility and to
reﬂect on the extent to which these were tied up with the EUKOR agreement.
In total 105 interviews were conducted as set out in Table 1. Of these 67
were in South Korea during January 2016 and March 2017 with individuals
representing trade unions, employer associations, auto ﬁrms and the Korean
government. The remainder were in the EU,mainly Brussels, duringMay/June
2016 and March 2017 European Commission officials and representatives of
industry associations and trade unions. To protect their identity, interviewees
C© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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are referenced anonymously according to an alphanumeric system (K23,
e.g., E12). The letter represents the location of the interview — K for
South Korea, E for EU — and the number a unique interviewee. Where a
dash separates two or more individual numbers (e.g. K61-K62), it indicates
that they were interviewed together. In order to minimize the dangers of
interviewee bias affecting key conclusions, interviews were triangulated across
multiple interviewee types and/or by verifying with documentary evidence,
including Korean-language documents translated on behalf of the authors.
Any signiﬁcant differences in opinions between key informants are explicitly
identiﬁed.
3. Hyundai’s GPN and Korea’s automotive labour regime
In this section, we map the GPN of the HMG and examine its differential
consequences for employment relations across the varied ﬁrms in the
sector, that is, the interaction between the workplace and global scales of
Korea’s automotive labour regime. It is onto this map that we subsequently
detail the consequences of the trade-based integration of EUKOR in
Section 4.
The automobile industry constitutes around 7 per cent of GDP and may
account for up to 15 per cent of manufacturing employment in South Korea
(Song and White 2018).1 Almost 65 per cent of Korea’s auto production is
exported making the industry sensitive to shifts in trading dynamics such as
those as generated by FTAs. Over 75 per cent of all ﬁnished production is
accounted for by HMG, which includes Hyundai Motor Company and Kia
Motors, acquired in 1998 (KAMA 2014, 2017). As shown in Figure 1, HMG
coordinates a domestic production network of around 400 ﬁrst-tier and 2,000
to 3,000 second-tier suppliers. Many of the latter also supply the other lead
ﬁrm manufacturers in Korea, which, in declining order of production units,
are General Motors, Renault-Samsung and SsangYong Motors (KAMA
2014, 2017).
HMG’s production network is commercially ‘captive’ in the sense
that its suppliers are transactionally dependent on HMG (Kim 2015).
HMG dominates South Korean auto manufacturing, including through
its outsourcing subsidiary Hyundai Mobis. By virtue of its unparalleled
dominance as the system integrator, HMG coordinates and controls relations
in the production network to capture surplus value and outsource cost and risk
to ﬁrst- and second-tier suppliers (K37-39, K54, K61-62). HMG’s strategy of
squeezing suppliers appears to have intensiﬁed: between 2006 and 2014 the
average cost of a ﬁnished car increased by 34 per cent while the cost of parts
increased by only 2 per cent (PSPD and KMWU 2016: 44). This is reﬂected
in the stratiﬁcation of proﬁt rates in the supplier network (Figure 1). Smaller
proﬁt rates in the lower tiers have translated into poorer wages, worse working
conditions and reduced capacities of labour to organize (K37-39, K48, K49,
K50-51, K55, K56). Companies in these tiers ‘are trying to increase irregular
C© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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workers and outsource to address pressures of competition’ (K53). Migrant
workers fromSoutheast Asia andMongolia in the second tier are often doubly
disadvantaged because of their migrant status, especially where they are not
registered or are on short-stay working visas (K61-62).
WithinHMG, employment relations have been impacted by twomanagerial
strategies: the segmentation of the workforce and ‘circular shareholding’.
Segmentation can be traced back to the auto workers who were among the
vanguard of South Korea’s democratization movement in the 1980s after
decades of dictatorship, justiﬁed and enabled by the Cold War context in
Northeast Asia (Kwon and O’Donnell 1999; Eder 1997; Glassman and Choi
2014). Auto workers’ self-conﬁdence and distrust of management translated
intomilitant trade unionism, which produced a number of workplace victories
in negotiating wide-ranging employment gains through much of the 1990s
(Koo 2001; Lansbury et al. 2006). In response to the 1997 economic crisis,
the Korean state and the IMF began to erode these gains through labour law
reform, including the encouragement of subcontracting, albeit for amaximum
of two years (Kwon and O’Donnell 1999, Lee and Lee 2003; K53). After years
of dealing with militant unionism, Hyundai executives used the opportunity
to quickly employ a greater number of subcontracted ‘irregular’ workers
(K61-K62). Regular and irregular workers were played off against each other
through the 2000s and into the 2010s (Lee and Frenkel 2004; Yun 2016).
HMG employed a greater number of younger, precarious, irregular workers at
lower pay (at Hyundai Motors monthly wages were 60–70 per cent of regular
workers) and with far reduced working conditions (e.g. no paid holidays,
supervised toilet breaks), often to work on the same production line as regular
workers (Yun 2016; K54, K55). This in turn served to discipline regular
workers through the threat of wage cuts and job insecurity (Lee and Frenkel
2004; Kim 2015; K53).
Circular shareholding is the practice used by many family-controlled
conglomerates in South Korea (chaebols) to transfer value between legally
separate publicly limited entities to smaller, family-controlled ones in ways
that mask ﬁnancial performance and facilitate continued familial control,
including succession. It is widely recognized that HMG subsidiaries such
as Glovis and Hyundai Mobis (see Figure 1) use intra-group transactions
to redistribute value away from suppliers and control away from external
shareholders (K37-39, K41, K45-46, K52, K54; Kim and Jin 2017; KMWU
2017; PSPD and KMWU 2016). For example, Mobis is the entity where
Chung Mong-Koo (HMG’s CEO) has his second largest shareholding and is
thought to be the de facto controlling company of HMG (K35, K37-39, K47;
Jung 2017). Mobis was formed in 2000 to coordinate and produce module
systems and parts supply for after-service; emerging to be the world’s number
seven auto parts supplier in 2017 (K54, K57-59; Wad 2008; Automotive News
2018). One explanation for the rise of Mobis is its use of its strategic position
in the HMG production network of concentrating parts supply to capture a
portion of value from suppliers ‘like a commission’ (K35). For example, its
annual proﬁt rate did not drop below 8 per cent between 2008 and 2015, even
C© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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during 2008–09 when the global economic crisis saw losses in two competing
parts suppliers, Bosch and Denso (KMWU 2017: 13). Mobis’s proﬁt rate is
consistently 50 per cent greater than the Korean average for ﬁrst-tier auto
parts suppliers. A similar dynamic is apparent for HMG ‘specially related
companies’ that provide marketing and IT services within the group; again
Chung Mong-Koo’s share ownership is proportionately much higher in these
entities and they had proﬁt rates above theHMGaverage (KMWU2017). One
implication of circular shareholding for employment relations is that proﬁt
is captured from the production network and paid out as executive wealth
rather than being redistributed in the form of wages, especially among lower
tier workers, and/or R&D, thus potentially undermining future security of
employment. For example, Hyundai Motor Company’s spending on R&D
between 2011 and 2015 was around half that of German rival Volkswagen
(PSPD and KMWU 2016: 45).
Formal labour representation in Korea’s auto production network is
uneven, with 70–80 per cent unionization in branded-manufacturers and in
ﬁrst-tier auto parts and module ﬁrms, but only 20–30 per cent in second-
tier suppliers (K47). This still contrasts positively with a national union
density of around 10 per cent (K5, K22, K23), which halved from over
20 per cent in the late 1980s (Koo 2001). Two competing unions organize
auto workers across these thousands of ﬁrms. The Korean Metal Workers’
Union (KMWU) predominates in HMG and other lead ﬁrms’ workplaces
and is formally organized as an industrial union. The Federation of Korean
Metal Workers’ Trade Unions (FKMTU) tends to be more active in supplier
ﬁrms and organizes around branches at individual factories.2 This seemingly
corresponds to the conventional characterization of labour organizing in
Korea, with ‘solidarity-oriented industrial unionism’ on the one hand and
‘micro-corporatistic enterprise unionism’ on the other (Lee 1998). However,
in practice the distinction blurs. Even though KMWU is organized at the
national level as an industrial union, the only collective bargaining agreement
it negotiates across the industry as whole concerns the minimum wage (K47;
K50-51). As such, the majority of industrial relations activity in Korea’s
automotive labour regime is characterized by ‘an enterprise agreement legacy,
which is a cultural history . . . the core contents on working conditions and
labour standards is in enterprise agreements’ (K47; also, K36; K47; K49; K50-
51). The long-standing culture of enterprise unionism is reproduced by the
fact that workers in leading factories in the production network, especially
those owned by HMG, are able to negotiate better pay and conditions at
the enterprise level (K50-51; K54; K61-62; Lee 2011a). The leaderships of
KMWU and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), of which
it is a leading member, are clear on this tension and are actively building
solidarity (especially with irregular workers), engaging in ongoing campaigns
to increase regularization, and developing social movement unionism (K5,
K26-28, K36, K38, K41, K47, K50-51; Fleckenstein and Lee 2019). Efforts
to promulgate industrial unionism are further undermined at the scale
of the state through the design of national labour law (Lee 2011a) and
C© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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non-ratiﬁcation of ILO conventions 87 and 98 on Freedom of Association
and on Collective Bargaining.
Enterprise unionism is actively nurtured by HMG as a managerial
strategy to encourage competition among workers and undermine industrial
unionism. HMG management has widely suppressed organizers among
irregular workers and discouraged union membership among the rank-and-
ﬁle (Lee 2011a; Doucette and Kang 2018). It also refuses to negotiate with
the KMWU on an industrial scale, insisting that this must be done by
‘independent’ entities. HMG itself uses an internal division at the Group
level — the Labour Policy Unit — to coordinate its employment policy and
union negotiations across the Kia-Hyundai separation (K61-K62). HMG
representatives were certainly very sensitive about labour, suddenly pushing
an interview to close when the topic of ‘human resources’ was brought up
(K45-K46). As another interviewee put it, ‘The power of HMG is so great
that it drags trade unions here and there’ (K49; also, K54).
Wages paid to ‘regular’ workers employed by HMG are the highest across
the entire industrial sector in Korea, and their salaries are estimated at two to
three times the national average (K35). First-tier and second-tier workers are
paid at, respectively, 60–70 per cent and 30–40 per cent of HMG wages
(K37-39; K47; K54; K61-62; Cho 2006; Lee 2011a), leading some to argue
that HMG workers gain at the direct expense of others in the production
network (K35; K47; K54; K55; K66). Others argue that KMWU’s regional
branches— especially the HyundaiMotor Company’s militant Ulsan branch,
the world’s largest car factory — are at the forefront of improvements in
employment relations across the sector, setting the pattern for other KMWU
branches and for FKMTU (K36; K50-51; K51; K54; K55; K57-59; K61-62).
From this perspective, one of the reasons for the lower pay further down
the supply chain is said to be the difficulty of labour organizing in smaller
ﬁrms, where ‘in many cases there are personal relations between owners and
workers’ (K47; also K55). The paradox of KMWU is that its members can
be interpreted as both ‘labour aristocracy’ and ‘vanguard’. KMWU is not
entirely a ‘pattern setter’ as pay and conditions stem from each ‘company’s
performance and are negotiated from there’ (K53; also, K47; K57-59; K67),
yet value is unevenly distributed through the production network and HMG’s
regular workers stridently defend their branch-level gains, which may be
reduced if an industry-wide agreement were reached (K47; K51; K54; K55).
At the same time, KWMU successes have transformed employment relations
in a signiﬁcant proportion of the wider automotive labour regime. These
include an agreement withHMG in the early 2010s to regularize 6,000workers
by the end of 2017 and, perhaps most signiﬁcantly, a reduction in working
hours (K47, K54, K61-62).
Despite the context of HMG’s divide-and-rule approach to employment
relations and successive pro-business governments eroding labour standards
and repressing worker resistance, most notably the Park Geun-hye
administration’s (2013–2017) attempt at sweeping labour law reforms
and imprisonment of KCTU leaders (see below), KMWU’s Hyundai Motors
C© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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Ulsan branch negotiated amajor change in the shift structure at the enterprise
level which transformed shift patterns through much of Korea’s automotive
labour regime. Starting at two 12-hour shifts, Hyundai Motor Company
transitioned to two ten-hour shifts by 2013 (ending late-night work) and to
two eight-hour shifts by 2015.3 This gain was won at the same pay, albeit
with some intensiﬁcation of the labour process via a 2–3 second speed up of
the production line to 64 seconds per task (K37-39, K47, K51, K60, K61-62;
IndustriALL 2013). The requirements of just-in-time production (i.e. low-
factory ﬂoor inventory, where parts and modules are supplied accordingly
to highly calibrated time slots) meant that ﬁrst-tier suppliers were compelled
to mimic Hyundai Motor Company’s new shift patterns, quickly diffusing
a reduced working day through the production network and demonstrating
one way in which the workplace and GPN scales interact (K37-39, K53, K55,
K56, K57-59).
4. The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Korea’s automotive labour
regime
Having characterized the Korean automotive labour regime in terms of
the workplace and GPN, we now bring in the national scale. As noted
above, this scale serves as the best starting point to consider how the trade-
based integration (liberalization, standardization and constitutionalization)
augured by the EUKOR agreement has affected Korea’s automotive labour
regime. In this section, ﬁrst we explore the negotiation of EUKOR to
explain how the particular provisions governing automotive trade and labour
standards came about and what they were intended to do. Then we examine
the institutional form and implementation of the labour provisions within
EUKOR and why they have been unable to gain much traction within the
automotive labour regime. Finally, we take this a step further to examine the
adverse effects of the commercial provisions within EUKOR on HMG and,
in turn, the workers in its production network.
As set out above, EUKOR has been repeatedly cited by the European
Commission as a point of departure for its ‘new generation’ of FTAs and
commitment to labour standards as set out in the TSD chapters; a claim
acknowledged, albeit frequently challenged, by many interviewees in the
EU (E10, E14, E16, E20, E21, E26). Within EUKOR, the TSD chapter
contains both labour standards commitments and institutional mechanisms
for their implementation, summarized in Figure 2. This became the model
adopted and applied, with some variation, in all subsequent EU FTAs
(Harrison et al. 2019). The substantive commitments refer to the eight ILO
core conventions relating to freedom of association, non-discrimination at
work, child labour and forced labour. The institutional mechanisms consist
of an inter-governmental Committee on TSD, which is reported to by two
Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs) that include ‘civil society’ representation
of economic, social and environmental interest groups in the EU and Korea.
C© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
12 British Journal of Industrial Relations
F
IG
U
R
E
2
L
ab
ou
r
St
an
da
rd
s
C
om
m
it
m
en
ts
an
d
In
st
it
ut
io
na
lM
ec
ha
ni
sm
s
in
th
e
E
U
K
O
R
T
SD
C
ha
pt
er
.
C© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Trade-Based Integration and Labour Regimes 13
TABLE 2
EUKOR Tariff Phase Out for Passenger Vehicles and Auto Parts
South Korea European Union
Starting
tariff Timeframe
Starting
tariff Timeframe
Passenger cars 8% Eliminated over three
years for cars with
larger engines
(>3,000 cc) and ﬁve
years for smaller
cars
10% Eliminated over three or
ﬁve years depending
on engine size.
Auto parts 8% Removed immediately 3–4.5% Removed immediately
Source: Cooper et al. (2011: 7, 9); EUKOR (2011).
Should a dispute emerge, and a satisfactory resolution is not forthcoming in
consultations, either party can request independent adjudication in the form
of a Panel of Experts. The focus of the EU’s approach is thus one of aligning
with the laws and norms of the ILO, promoting inter-state dialogue towards
this end, and providing ‘voice’ to civil society actors to inform this process.
Negotiating Labour Governance and Automotive Trade in EUKOR
Respective South Korean administrations have consistently promoted FTAs
since 1997. For example, recognizing Korea’s heavy trade-dependence, the
Lee Myung-bak administration (2008–2013) and his pro-big business Grand
National Party (nowSaenuri Party) sawFTAs as the centrepiece in an ongoing
export promotion strategy of achieving duty-free market access for 70 per cent
of national exports, and attracting foreign investment (Office of the President
2009: 29). EUKOR was in part prioritized around liberalizing trade in the
automotive sector, Korea’s second largest export sector following electronics.
TheKorean automotive industry, dominated byHMG,was enthusiastic about
EUKOR because it was assumed that it would enhance EU market access
(K29, K30; Siles-Bru¨gge 2012).
In contrast, the European automobile manufacturers’ association (ACEA)
and the German auto industry initially opposed the negotiation of
liberalization of the auto trade under EUKOR because it considered Korean
imports as a threat and the restrictions imposed byKorea’s ‘non-tariff barriers’
as a major obstacle (ACEA 2010; E33). It also saw that Korea was reluctant to
accept the EU approach tomeasuring vehicle CO2 emissions; somewhat ironic
given that Volkswagen would later be ﬁned by environmental regulators the
world over, including in Korea, for cheating in emissions testing (European
Parliament 2010: 12). The Italian industry too was opposed, principally due
to concerns that HMG would compete directly with Fiat in the EU market
for small cars; as were Czechia, Poland and Slovakia because of the threat to
the competitiveness of foreign auto production investments in these countries
(Dalton 2009). As shown in Table 2, the longer-phase out of tariffs on the
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import of smaller cars from Korea was an attempt to mitigate these concerns,
but HMG’s setting up of factories in Central Europe in 2007 and 2008 that
specialize in smaller cars made this concession a moot point (E38, K35, K44,
K45-46, K49; Pavlı´nek and Zˇenak 2011).
The non-tariff barriers identiﬁed in automotive standards were central
to the negotiations, which was of particular signiﬁcance given parallel
FTA negotiations with the United States which was promoting its auto
standards over EU ones (Cooper et al. 2011; Platzer 2010). The result
was an annex on Motor Vehicles and Parts that bound South Korea to
recognize the World Forum for Harmonisation of Vehicle Regulations as ‘the
relevant international standard-setting body’ and to harmonize its standards
accordingly (EUKOR 2011: Annex 2-C, Articles 2 and 3). While the Annex
emphasizes ‘regulatory convergence’, the European Commission (2009)
itself pointed out that ‘Korea will essentially recognize as equivalent many
European standards’. Importantly for our purposes, the Annex established a
permanent Working Group on Motor Vehicles and Parts to meet annually
to monitor implementation and for the purposes of consultation, much like
the TSD chapter. But unlike the legally siloed Panel of Experts ‘dispute’
mechanism in the TSD chapter, automotive standards were covered by the
‘hard law’ dispute settlement process that regulates the implementation of
EUKOR as a whole, but with modiﬁcations that heighten the urgency of
any dispute and speed up the arbitration process (Annex 2-C, Article 10).
Put plainly, the constitutional dimension of EUKOR explicitly placed the
regulation of auto standards well over those of labour.
The commercial interests at stake in the negotiations over automobiles and
other high-value sectors such asmachinery and appliances played amajor role
in mitigating the EU’s ambition for the TSD chapter in the FTA with South
Korea. The notion of a TSD chapter and the labour provisions contained
within themwere not seen as a natural part of trade agreements by the Korean
side; they were proposed and driven through by EU negotiators (K23, K25,
K26). The relative size of the Korean market meant that negotiations were
less asymmetrical than other negotiations the EU was then conducting —
EUKORwas touted as the second largest FTA in history at the time, following
the North American Free Trade Agreement (Lee 2010). This made it more
difficult for the EU to impose a trade–labour linkage in EUKOR negotiations
as it had done when insisting on the inclusion of core labour standards in
its 2008 FTA with Caribbean countries (Harrison et al. 2019). As mentioned
above, the EU’s rapid advancing of FTA negotiations with Korea was spurred
by parallel FTA negotiations between Korea and the United States, with both
seeking a ﬁrstmover advantage (Cooper et al. 2011; Platzer 2010). Negotiators
from the European Commission had included a TSD chapter primarily as
a result of pressure from the European Parliament, supported by organized
civil society groups and European-level trade unions, and as such saw the
inclusion of labour standards as a narrow textual requirement and thus did
not pursue an aggressive pro-labour agenda (E7, E9, E12, E17; Barbu et al.
2018).
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These factors contributed to enabling Korean negotiators to successfully
demand fewer references to international labour standards and the removal
of any immediate obligation to ratify all fundamental ILO conventions (K25).
Korea has ratiﬁed only four of the eight ILO core conventions, and not the four
relating to freedom of association and forced labour. Thus, while EUKOR
contains a commitment by the parties to ‘respecting, promoting and realizing
in law and practice’ the eight fundamental ILO conventions, in contrast to all
of the TSD chapters negotiated since, EUKOR contains a rider that:
The Parties reaffirm the commitment to effectively implementing the ILO
conventions that Korea and the Member States of the European Union have
ratiﬁed, respectively. The Parties will make continued and sustained efforts towards
ratifying the fundamental ILO conventions as well as the other conventions that are
classiﬁed as ‘up-to-date’ by the ILO. (EUKOR2011: ch. 13, Art. 13.4, para. 3, added
emphasis)
EUKOR’s TSD Chapter and National Labour Governance
We turn our attention next to the question of whether the labour provisions
within the TSD chapter had any discernible effects on Korea’s automotive
labour regime. In this respect, early efforts following the launch of EUKOR
focused on Korea’s failure to make progress on ratifying ILO fundamental
conventions, especially relating to freedom of association. After European
and Korean trade unions had highlighted this issue in several joint meetings
between DAGs, the EU DAG eventually sent a letter to the Commission
requesting that formal consultations be initiated — a precursor to convening
the Panel of Experts. The basis of the EU DAG letter was that insufficient
efforts had beenmade towards ratifying key conventions and at the same time,
widespread violations of labour rights, particularly freedom of association,
were allegedly taking place, including in the auto industry (Jenkins 2014).
But the Trade Commissioner at the time, Karel De Gucht, rejected the
request and instead promised to pursue the matter through inter-state
dialogue (Vogt 2015). Perhaps reﬂecting the shift in policy emphasis of
the Commissioner since 2014 with Cecilia Malmstro¨m, the Commission
did start to make more public statements subsequent to this letter. These
included highlighting ‘serious concerns in particular in the area of trade
and sustainable development, i.e. on insufficient progress on the ratiﬁcation
and implementation of ILO conventions and on protection of labour rights
in Korea’ (European Commission 2017: 11; see also European Commission
2016: 12).
Trade union and other civil society representatives in Europe, however, were
sceptical that inter-state dialogue would produce tangible results for labour
standards in Korea (E15, E19, E26, E29). These concerns are reinforced by
the failure of European Commission officials to raise concerns about the
imprisonment of leading ﬁgures in the KCTU, despite their imprisonment
being widely condemned by relevant international bodies (ITUC 2016; FIDH
2018). The largest affiliate of the KCTU is the KMWU and as such auto
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workers play a major role in ﬁnancing and driving politically KCTU’s
activities (K5, K49, K61-62). European Commission officials emphasize the
difficulty of the labour situation in South Korea and that action taken under
the TSD chapter should not frustrate the overall objectives of the agreement
(E10, K24). One Commission official told us that:
It is important to have a positive forward looking agenda. Confrontation would lead
to a backlash on behalf of Korea. We want to add investment protection into the
agreement. If we took action under this chapter, we might lose beneﬁts elsewhere.
So we do need to think about the bigger context (E14).
This impasse appeared to have been removed with the impeachment
of President Park Geun-hye on corruption charges in March 2017 and
subsequent sentence to 25 years in prison. Presidential elections in May 2017
brought Moon Jae-in to power (his Democratic Party already had the largest
minority in the National Assembly) and the pro-business, repressive labour
reforms advanced by the Saenuri Party appeared shelved. Indeed, Moon’s
manifesto had committed to both labour reforms and to reform the circular
shareholding model of the chaebol. The minimum wage was increased, the
working week was capped at 52 hours, and the current and former KCTU
presidents released from prison. Further, HMG itself has been targeted in an
antitrust investigation by the Fair Trade Commission, which spurredHMG to
announce corporate governance reform by spinning off Mobis’s module and
after-service auto parts provision to Glovis (Jin and Lee 2018). However, by
mid-2018, Moon’s commitments were being squeezed by an economic slow-
down, the chaebols’ political power, and the emboldening of the Right within
theNational Assembly. TheKCTU respondedwith amass strike inNovember
2018, including KMWU workers, against Moon’s roll-back from chaebol and
working hours’ reforms (Harris and Song 2018).
In seeming response to the retrenchment of Moon’s electoral commitment
to reform labour governance, the European Commission sent a letter to the
Korean government in December 2018 requesting consultations under the
terms of the TSD chapter (EU 2018; also, Malmstro¨m 2019). The letter
highlights several speciﬁc concerns in the Korean Trade Union Act and
especially Korea’s failure to ‘to make continued and sustained efforts towards
ratifying the fundamental ILO Conventions’ as per EUKOR Article 13.4
(3). In July 2019, the European Commission triggered the Panel of Experts
mechanism (European Commission 2019a), which is an institutional ﬁrst
across the network of EU FTAs with TSD chapters. Nevertheless, the effect
of such a move remains unclear because, as noted earlier, Panel opinions are
only advisory and the TSD has no recourse to EUKOR’s dispute settlement
process.
Another case demonstrating apparent weaknesses in the TSD chapter
involves the exploitation of ‘dispatched workers’, a category of irregular
workers. Under Korean labour law it is illegal to dispatch manufacturing
employees from one ﬁrm to undertake work for another ﬁrm. HMG had
sought to get round this by renaming their practice as one of ‘in-house’
C© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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or ‘on-site’ subcontracting’ but was found guilty of dispatching workers to
suppliers because supplier ﬁrms were effectively controlled by HMG as they
have few or no alternative buyers for their product and Hyundai managers
were actively involved in supervision and control of these workers’ activities
(Lee and Chang 2015; K27; K28; K47). The issue of dispatched workers was
at no point raised by the DAG members within EUKOR. Thus, even where
Korean industry was found to have systematically contravened a domestic law
with clear implications for the ‘trade-related aspects of labour’ (EUKOR2011,
Article 13.2.1, emphasis added), the TSD process was entirely silent.
That issues faced by dispatched workers in the auto industry identiﬁed
above were not forcefully pursued by trade union and civil society
representatives certainly raises questions over whether this institutional
mechanism, as currently constituted, is sufficiently representative of all
workers’ interests, or whether it privileges the positions of formally organized
and represented workers. On the European side the focus of trade union and
civil society concern, as well as from Members of the European Parliament,
has been about the degree of independence from the Korean government
of academics and other professional researchers on the Korean Domestic
Advisory Group (E6, E17, E30). But there is also a question about the
degree to which the two trade union federations — the Federation of Korean
Trade Unions (FKTU) and KCTU who are the worker representatives on the
DAG — represent the interests of all workers. Among the most important
characteristics of theKorean labourmarket is the segmentation of regular and
irregular work, a central issue in Korea’s automotive labour regime and the
domestic economy as a whole. As highlighted in Section 3, irregular workers
receive substantially lower pay andworking conditions and facemajor hurdles
in formal self-organization, which tends to include proportionately more
women and unrepresented migrant workers (K23, Chang 2009; Lee 2015; Lee
andKang 2012; Kim 2015).While both national trade union federations work
hard to represent the interests of irregular workers — including sometimes
even against the interests of their own rank-and-ﬁle members –predilections
still persist (K5, K21-23, K31, K37-39, K47, K49, K61-62, K63).
Various observers and even some union officials point out that the relative
emphasis in negotiation practices still favours the interests of regular workers
(K49, K55, K56, K61-62, see also Chang 2009). When irregular workers self-
organize and take industrial action they are particularly vulnerable to attacks
by employers (K36, K37-39), including state-sanctioned practices of civil suits
for damages for the obstruction of business which allows for individuals
to be held liable (Doucette and Kang 2018). As of March 2015, a total of
US$148million in damage claims had beenmade in 17 cases, including against
three irregular worker branches at Hyundai Motors and several auto parts
companies. Individuals have taken their lives under the pressure of damage
claims, including two auto workers (Doucette and Kang 2018). Given that
nationally only 1–2 per cent of all irregular workers are members of a trade
union (K23), it may not be appropriate that the FKTU and KCTU are the
only worker representatives on the Korean DAG.
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HMG thus appears to have been able to ignore national labour law and
a juridical ruling reaffirming it, and these workers were directly involved in
producing cars, many of which would have been exported to the EU market.
This issue was not formally raised in the context of the TSD chapter, despite
this containing an obligation that the parties ‘shall not weaken or reduce
. . . labour protections afforded in its laws to encourage trade or investment’
(EUKOR 2011, Article 13.7). Further, the Park Geun-hye administration
sought to push a number of repressive reforms to domestic labour law (K10,
K22, K23). This included a proposed law allowing dispatched workers in
manufacturing, which was known among some observers as ‘Chung Mong-
Koo’s law’, the CEO of HMG, because it would have allowed for the
continuation of his ﬁrm’s existing practices.
In summary, despite the expectations around governing international
labour standards in the context of major trade agreements, the institutions
of the TSD chapter have been slow in making progress on the serious and
contested labour issues which have been raised by DAG representatives.
It remains unclear what material effect the Panel of Experts advisory
recommendations will play in driving through improvements given the overall
architecture of the TSD chapter and its separation from more legally binding
dispute settlement areas of the agreement, which for the latter include more
meaningful recourse to trade remedy mechanisms, compensation and even
the possibility of suspension of the trade agreement. Equally, other issues of
particular importance to the auto industry have not been raised at all via the
DAG process, perhaps in part because of questions about the extent to which
the DAGs are representative of the most vulnerable workers. Consequently,
the key mechanism seeking to regulate international labour standards via
trade agreements remains signiﬁcantly constrained in its ability to intervene
in a meaningful manner. In other words, at the national and workplace scale,
the automotive labour regime appears to be largely unaffected by the labour
provisions of EUKOR. Where EUKOR has changed employment relations,
though not for the better, is via the commercial pressures on the production
network of HMG, discussed in the following section.
EUKOR, Automotive Trade and the HMG Production Network
Here we argue that the implementation of EUKOR — especially liberalized
market access for EU automobile imports and harmonized auto standards
— is putting new commercial pressures on HMG, threatening the current
conﬁguration of the labour regime and eroding employment relations. The
commercial effects of EUKOR on the parties’ respective auto markets and
industries were the converse of expectations. European industry had predicted
a loss to the EU auto industry because of an assumed increase in exports from
Korea (see Siles-Bru¨gge 2012). Instead, as shown in Figure 3, the EU’s long-
term automobile trade deﬁcit with Korea switched to a surplus in 2014–2016.
In 2016Korea imported 171,000 cars from the EU: 80 per cent fromGermany,
of which BMW and Mercedes-Benz had a 76 per cent share (KAIDA 2018).
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Indeed, these two auto ﬁrms constituted 47 per cent ofKorea’s 2016 imports in
number of automobiles from the EU, Japan and the United States combined.
The dominance of high-end, large vehicles is reﬂected by EU exports to Korea
being double the price per unit of volume compared to Korean exports to the
EU (author calculations using Eurostat 2018).
The EUKOR agreement has arguably been central to this turnaround in
the EU-Korea auto-trade surplus.4 Certainly that was the position of the
Korean auto industry, which saw a once relatively protected market suddenly
ﬂooded with German cars following the three-year phase out of the 8 per
cent tariff on large cars (Table 2; K44, K63-65). Given that large cars are
priced more highly, Korea’s previous import tariff had a proportionately
more protective effect in making European cars more expensive compared
to domestically produced ones. European Commission officials mirror this
argument by taking credit that their negotiation of EUKOR beneﬁtted EU
auto producers (E33). Alongside tariff liberalization has been the importance
of standardization in allowing scale economies in auto distribution and
post-sales servicing. Before the expansion of Korean imports of German
cars, the costs of maintaining sales and service centres were higher, but with
the rise in imports coinciding with EUKOR liberalization and the reduced
per unit cost of parts with standards harmonization, increased market share
meant that overhead costs were reduced and the retail price of German cars
and parts were more competitive (K35, K45-46). These scale economies are
partly illustrated in an almost doubling in monetary value of auto parts
exports from the EU to Korea between 2008 and 2018, from 557 million
to 923 million (author calculations using Eurostat 2018). As a whole, this
further reduced the consumer costs of running a German car in Korea,
thereby contributing to the erosion of HMG’s long-term domestic market
advantages.
The upshot of these various dynamics is that the implementation of
EUKOR has contributed directly to Korea’s growing import of large German
cars which has put pressure on HMG’s proﬁtability with implications for
domestic workplace relations. A major issue here, quite simply, is that larger
cars are more proﬁtable. While some parts are of a higher quality, many
are the same or similar, and most of all the labour process of assembling
even ‘luxury’ cars is largely equivalent, with the result that the cost of
labour power per unit is commensurate to a small car. HMG responded
to competition by launching in 2017 its Genesis brand with its ‘luxurious
image [designed] to push our range as a whole’ (K45-46), but it is yet to
displace the status of German brands in Korea or in export markets (K35,
K54, K60, K63-65). Yet proﬁt margins at both Hyundai Motors and Kia
dropped continuously since 2014 (KMWU 2017; Bloomberg 2018a,b). The
decline in proﬁtability is the result of a number of factors, including executive
capture through circular shareholding, declining exports to China and the
United States, and the failure to identify market trends in product types, but
the inﬂux of competing German products in the high-margin large vehicle
market has certainly played a major role (K37-39). The combined Hyundai-
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Kia share of the Korea auto market dropped from around 80 per cent in
the 2000s to around 65 per cent in 2016 (K35, K45-46, K52, K54, K60).
While in parallel HMG’s global sales increased, the loss of domestic market
share is of particular commercial signiﬁcance because HMG’s long-term
strategy was to use the relative protection of Korea’s trade regime (tariff
and non-tariff barriers) to charge a higher price for cars sold domestically
compared to export and transplant markets (K29, K30, K41, K44). This
strategy of capturing greater proﬁts in Korea allows HMG to cross-subsidize
and ‘overcome ﬁnancial losses at the initial stage in foreign markets’ (K54,
also K41). As a result, Korean industry contested the win-win arguments
advanced by the European Commission in relation to EUKOR (K45-46);
European industry, in contrast, was said to be ‘happy’ with the outcome
(E33).
HMG’s export-oriented production in Korea remains crucial to its business
model and by extension, employment relations, as evidenced in the active
positions adopted by trade unions. Even though HMG has a GPN of
own-factories and captive suppliers in its major markets (e.g. the EU and
United States), exports from Korea continue to make-up a major component
in its product mix. At the same time, HMG does not import cars into Korea
from its overseas factories (e.g. in China) because ‘the trade unions will block
it — and the government supports this’. This means that unlike competitors
such as General Motors, HMG is not able to fully capitalize on its GPN and
Korea’s network of FTAs in order to plan its ‘footprint portfolio’ according to
pure cost considerations (K63-65, alsoReed 2012). Further,KMWUbranches
actively negotiate with HMG to produce domestically cars that command
higher margins (e.g. larger cars and the Genesis brand) and those using new
‘eco-friendly’ technologies such as hybrid, electronic and hydrogen cars (K57-
58, K61-62). This effectively blocks HMG from producing higher-margin cars
in its overseas factories. An analysis by KMWU conﬁrms this dynamic by
suggesting that the proﬁtability ofHMG’s overseas plants is low and thatmost
proﬁt comes from Korean plants (K41, also E36-37, K61-62).
It is important to emphasize that KMWU auto workers actively shape
the contours of the labour regime, even in so far as demanding high-proﬁt
production in Korea because they know that this gives them greater leverage
to extract higher wages and better working conditions. This strategy stems in
large part from the high level of proﬁtability of HMG’s domestic production
and Korean auto workers’ effective articulation of demands around the
ongoing centrality of Korea in HMG’s GPN. Yet, the main long-term effect
that EUKOR is having is to erode HMG’s proﬁtability with the rapid rise in
imported European cars, which represents an erosion of the elemental basis
for high salaries and good working conditions for HMG’s workers. Given
the importance of HMGworkers to shaping employment relations in Korea’s
automotive labour regime as a whole, such an outcome does not bode well for
sector-wide working conditions. Indeed, the Korea auto industry’s negative
view of the effects of EUKOR was being borne-out by late 2018 in a growing
crisis in Korea’s automotive industry. GM Korea closed one of its plants in
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2018 due to poor sales (including domestically), and auto parts ﬁrms were to
receive government supports of over US$ 3.1 billion (Choi and Jin 2018; Song
and White 2018).
5. Conclusions
It is well established that both the GPNs of transnational capital and the
international trade agreements of states matter for employment relations, but
there is less research showing how they interrelate. Our contention in this
article has been that these two literatures need to be brought into closer
conversation, particularly in relation to the labour standards provisions that
have proliferated within the FTAs constituting the leading edge of trade-based
integration. Among these is the 2011 EU-South Korea FTA, noteworthy as
the EU’s ﬁrst ‘new generation’ FTA that proposed to protect and promote
core labour standards and ensure that international trade would not lead to
erosion in domestic labour law— a commonly cited reason why globalization
supposedly leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ in labour rights and working
conditions.
Our theoretical contribution has been that a critical analysis of such
FTAs must consider how they articulate with sector-speciﬁc labour regimes,
conceptualized here at the scales of the workplace, the nation-state and
the GPN. In our particular case on the Korean auto industry, we have
emphasized the relational processes that exist between these scales, showing,
for instance, howKorean automotive workers sought to inﬂuence the patterns
of HMGproduction and export, even going so far as demanding the domestic
production of high-proﬁt vehicles because they know that this gives them
greater leverage to extract higher wages and better working conditions.
But by the same token, HMG has organized its production network in
such a way as to create and sustain differential outcomes in employment
relations, such that signiﬁcant inequalities exist within and across the
workplaces of the Korean automotive industry between regular and irregular
workers.
In terms of the impact of the EUKOR at the scale of the Korean nation-
state, we have shown that while the institutions of the TSD chapter have
only recently (and after years of sustained pressure from trade union groups)
found ways of making progress on the serious and contested labour issues
which have been raised by DAG representatives such that the Panel of Experts
process has been convened, the non-binding nature of any recommendations
constrains meaningful change. Meanwhile other issues that are particularly
important in the auto industry have not been raised at all, perhaps in
part because DAGs are not representative of all workers. Consequently,
there has been no discernible change in labour standards in the automotive
sector as a result of the TSD mechanisms. Indeed, entire segments of the
workforce do not have a voice in the TSD process, despite being among
the most highly unionized and militant sectors in Korea. This indicates
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an important mismatch in the design of labour standards in EU FTAs
which tend to privilege formally organized workers in strategic positions of
production networks over those in more precarious positions, and thus in
most potential need of the protections that the TSD chapter purports to
offer. Finally, wemoved beyond the conventional approach to studying labour
provisions in FTAs by considering them alongside the commercial provisions.
Here, we argued that the tariff liberalization and standards harmonization
under EUKOR is both directly and indirectly eroding the proﬁtability of
major employers in Korea’s automotive industry by shifting the competitive
conditions in the Korean auto market, with adverse employment relations
consequences for workers, especially in the more insecure and low-paid jobs.
In these ways, Korea’s automotive labour regime shaped aspects of the
negotiation and implementation of the FTA; and over time, the FTA has
materially shaped the labour regime.
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Notes
1. OECD (2018a) indicates that 4,503,840 are employed in manufacturing in Korea.
Lead auto ﬁrm and ﬁrst-tier suppliers’ employees alonemake up 9 per cent of total
manufacturing employment, at 125,754 and 293,146, respectively, in 2016 (KAMA
2017: 4, 21). Korea’s Ministry of Commerce reportedly puts the ﬁgure at 7 per cent
of employment (Song andWhite 2018) but based on the KAMA data this is a gross
underestimate.
2. It is estimated that around 90 per cent of auto workers in Korea are male (K47),
but some HMG factories employ a higher proportion of women (e.g. 35 per cent in
one). In this latter factory, workers are members of FKMTU at enterprise level and
representatives claimed to have ‘a high level of maternity protection in the factory’,
an outcome of ‘gradual change over last 10 years’ that is ‘ahead of the law’, with
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the effect that the resignation rate among women is under 1 per cent (K57-59). This
effect was also supported by the end of night shifts (see below).
3. This constituted a reduction in hours worked from between 2,500 and 2,700 hours
a year to around 2,000 hours, although one interviewee pointed out the prior peak
of 2,700 hours was itself a violation of Korea labour law (K56). In comparative
context, South Korea is third only to Mexico and Costa Rica within the OECD in
terms of the longest number of hours actually worked per worker between 2008 and
2017, with Korea being 15 per cent above the 2016 OECD annual average of 1,765
hours (OECD 2018b).
4. In contrast, representatives of EU industry emphasized that the trend was already
an upward one from 2009 because of consumer preference — ‘Korean’s like our
cars’ — and the sharp depreciation of the euro to the Korean won from a 2009
peak (E33, E36-379).
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